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BOOK REVIEW
SOCIAL ORDER AND THE

LIMITS

OF

LAW: A

THEORETICAL

ESSAY. By

Iredell Jenkins. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1980. Pp. xiv, 390. $25.00.
Reviewed by Arthur S. Miller*
"If men were angels," James Madison asserted in a famous essay, "no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first
enable the government to control the governed, and in the next
place oblige it to control itself."1 Control over the governed is well
established in the United States. But how can government be
obliged to control itself? This question is based on the assumption,
indubitably valid, that those who govern will not limit themselves
unless some external force makes them do so. In that sense, the
Constitution-American constitutionalism l -- is a legally concretized command directed toward government officers to act decently
toward the citizenry. Throughout American history a gap has always existed between pretense and reality; seeming constitutional
absolutes are, in general, mere relative admonitions to act reasonably under the circumstances.3 In the United States the external
force that supposedly controls those who govern is given the label
of "law." That view of the social process, however, is far too limited. Other forces constrain human behavior. Politics-political
force-for example, can and does help keep power-wielders within
bounds. At times, as is obvious, those bounds are over-stepped,
Professor Emeritus of Law, The George Washington University National Law Center.
B.A., 1938, Willamette University; LL.B., 1949, Stanford University; J.S.D., 1959, Yale
University.
1. THE FEDERALisT No. 51 (J. Madison) 323 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
2. On the necessary distinction between democracy and constitutionalism, see
Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. RE V. 703, 707-08 (1980).
3. See A. MILLER, DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CONSTITUTION OF CONTROL (1981); Miller, Reason of State and the Emergent Constitution of Control, 64 MINN.
L. REv. 585 (1980).
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and opportunities arise for various types of social controls, including law, to come into play.4
As Roscoe Pound once maintained, 5 law may indeed be the
most important of those devices by which human action is circumscribed. Consequently, it is particularly necessary that all who look
to the law to help ameliorate the conditions of an urbanized, industrialized, class society consider what Professor Iredell Jenkins
calls "the limits of law" in this well-written, provocative, and important book.
Professor Jenkins maintains that Americans demand that "the
law solve all of [their] problems and secure all of [their] purposes." The result is that we "so overload the legal apparatus that
it short circuits, creating a spectacular display of fireworks but
affecting nothing save its own wreckage."' 7 That assertion, even if
only partially accurate, merits close and continuing attention.
Jenkins' analysis of that hypothesis-that proposition-is at once
thought-provoking and illuminating. We are all in his debt for having written such a challenging book, even though I have some
fundamental disagreements with how he develops that theme. Jenkins' work is a significant contribution and should be on the reading list of all lawyers-certainly all lawyers in Academia, whether
in the professoriate or the student body.
Unfortunately, although this book is essential reading, I do not
expect my recommendation to be followed. The study of law is far
too vocational, too reductionist, and too concentrated on the nutsand-bolts of what lawyers do.8 Law schools annually graduate
thousands who have managed to survive the nit-picking boredom
of law classes, but those graduates find that they know very little
about law. They know many rules of law, and thus can and do
readily pass bar examinations; but they have little conception of
the role of law in a polity that trumpets that it has a "government
of laws, not of men." Reading Jenkins will not correct all of that
sorry state of affairs-far from it. It will, however, help those who
read and heed it to "analyze the context from which law derives,
the environment within which it exists and acts, the enduring
4. See generally J. RoucEK, SoCIAL CONTROL 83-90 (2d ed. 1956).
5. R. POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW (1942).

6.

The quotation comes from the back cover of the book under review. See L JENMNS,

SOCIAL ORDER AND THE Lnwrs OF LAW: A THmoRrmcAL EssAY (1980).
7. Id.

8. See Miller, Reductionism in the Law Schools, 16 SAN DIEGO L. Rnv. 891 (1979);
Miller, Legal Education as a Form of Brain Damage (forthcoming).
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problems with which it has to deal, and the conditions it must
satisfy if it is to succeed.""
That task is a large order, but Jenkins, a philosopher who has
not had the dubious benefit of a legal education, goes far toward
filling it. He at least asks many of the correct questions, without
which correct answers will never be forthcoming. One does not
have to agree with Jenkins' conclusions to perceive that his tightly
argued essay in metaphysics and sociological jurisprudence surely
must be carefully considered as Americans enter "the age of
frugality." 10
The major shortcoming that I find in this book is its lack of
systematic discussion of politics and economics-of, that is, the
political economy of American constitutionalism. In saying that, I
realize that the criticism is of a book that Jenkins did not set out
to write. Nonetheless, it is vital to perceive that law and the legal
system are integral parts of the State and cannot be understood
apart from it.11 Professor Jenkins, of course, knows this fact; he
states,
Law is but one participant in the undertaking of human culture as a
whole-the conscious and directed efforts through which man seeks to develop his own powers, to master the resources of the world, and to arrange his
multiple affairs successfully. This effort spawns a great many institutions:
family, morality, religion, science, technology, economic and industrial organizations, positive law, and others."2

Jenkins, however, does not analyze the State, s nor does he ask the
crucial question: cui bono? Who benefits in fact from these institutions, including law? Had Jenkins so asked, he might have con9.

I.

JENKINS,

supra note 6, at xii.

10. On the age of frugality, see E. AsHBy,RECONCILING MAN WITH THE ENVIRONMENT
(1978); L. BROWN, THE TwSETY-NIrrH DAY (1978); W. JOHNSON, MUDDLING TowARD FRuGALITY (1978); R. MILEs, AWAKENING FROM THE AMERicAN DRFim-TH SOCIAL AND POLITIcAL LIMITS TO GROWTH (1976); Miller, ConstitutionalLaw: Crisis Government Becomes the
Norm, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 736 (1978).
11. It is a commonplace of sociology that the functioning of a state and its legal
system are closely intertwined. In settled times this fact may become obscured. The
apparent independence of the legal system from current political disputes lends support to the myth that law is something above and apart from the society which it helps
to regulate and control ....

[A] legal system may reflect both the values and the

power structure of the state.
K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, LAW AND STATE: THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND 1
(1975). See J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964).
12. I. JENKINS, supra note 6, at 313.
13. For a brief preliminary discussion, see Miller, Reason of State and the Emergent
Constitution of Control, supra note 3, at 620-26; Miller & Bowman, PresidentialAttack on
the Constitutionality of FederalStatutes, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 51, 60-70 (1979).
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cluded, as Holmes did more than a century ago, that law is not
neutrally derived or applied. 14 Asserting that there is no "identity
of interest between the different parts of a community," Holmes
maintained that the only unity in law is the answer given by
Thrasymachus: law, including decisions of courts, represents the
interests of the stronger-the powerful interests in society. 15 American law, particularly as taught in law schools, is based on the assumption that general rules, applied even-handedly and impartially, produce consequences beneficial to all. That belief is the
liberal theory of the rule of law; it is a legal counterpart to Adam
Smith's invisible hand. Holmes, and others, have seen through that
assumption.""
What I am suggesting, of course, is that "the limits of law"
must be viewed against the background of a theory of society and
of the manner in which law actually operates in that society.
Again, Professor Jenkins is not unaware of this view. For example,
in writing about privileged admissions and other human rights, he
states,
The history of privileged admission stands as a model and a warning of
[the] dangerous tendencies that are inherent in human rights. I think that it
is beyond dispute that most, though not all, of the pleas that are urged in this
guise are reasonable and justified: they are voiced by groups of persons who
suffer under conditions that are both insupportable and inexcusable, and
they impose upon society the obligation to correct them. The claims advanced as human rights should thus be acknowledged and pursued as social
goals. But they should not be recognized as legal rights, for to give them this
by undermining the social
status threatens to defeat the claims themselves
17
structure on which their realization depends.

How can a "social goal" be realized? Jenkins does not tell us. Since
at least Justice Stone's famous footnote in the Carolene Products
case,1 8 it has been widely acknowledged that "discrete and insular
minorities" all too often do not benefit from the political process;
accordingly, they have no way in which their "reasonable and justified" pleas can be satisfied.1 9 Some commentators, such as Justice
14. Comment, The Gas-Stoker's Strike, 7 AM. L. REv. 582 (1873). For discussion of
Holmes' comment, see Tushnet, The Logic of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on the
Supreme JudicialCourt, 63 VA. L. REv. 975, 1029-31 (1977). See also Lerner, Constitution
and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290, 1316 n.71 (1937).
15. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, Book I, 338-39 (2d rev. ed. D. Lee trans. 1974).
16. See, e.g., Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretationof
Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1307 (1979).
17. I. JENINS, supra note 6, at 311.
18. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
19. For analysis and discussion of the Carolene Productsfootnote, see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DiSTRUST 75-77 (1980).
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Felix Frankfurter and votaries in the cult of Frankfurter worship,
address that problem by telling people to pull up their own socks
and get more political power.20 Professor John Hart Ely would
reach that result by a "representation-reinforcing" theory of judicial review. 21 Still others apparently proceed on the belief that
whatever exists is right, and thus22 provide for no creativity in the
development of the Constitution.
The problem of the storied "rule of law" is that adumbrated
by Holmes: some benefit more than others. It is neutral in neither
origin, application, nor interpretation. Law, particularly that enunciated by courts, with which Professor Jenkins is most concerned,
is an extension of politics carried on by other means. Any societal
institution, including law and the legal system, has both manifest
and latent functions. 3 The same may be said for the beneficiaries
of law; they are obvious or they are hidden. Sometimes the two
categories meet and merge. Historically, law, not excluding the
Constitution itself, has benefited the moneyed and propertied.2 4
Even in modern times, when the Supreme Court and other courts
have outwardly sought to further the cause of human rights in
their decisions, it is not inaccurate to maintain that these decisions, too, further the interests of those who have always profited
from the system. The obvious beneficiary may, for example, be
Black Americans, who in recent decades have persuaded courts
and legislatures to throw off the bonds of peonage. Nevertheless, a
persuasive argument can be made that the hidden beneficiary is
still the "governing class," which benefits from having discontent
siphoned off and channeled into relatively innocuous forms. In
other words, the manifest function of the human rights decisions
of government, with which Professor Jenkins is concerned, is to aid
those discrete and insular minorities that Justice Stone mentioned,
but the latent function is that stated by Professor J.A.G. Griffith
in his important book, The Politics of the Judiciary: "The judici20.

E.g., A. BIcKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).

21. See J. ELY, supra note 19, at 77-78.
22. A classic example of this type of scholarly myopia is R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JumicRY (1977). Another odd bit of scholarly antiquarianism, pathetic in its attempt to be
profound, is Bridwell, The Scope of JudicialReview: A Dirge for the Theorists of Majority
Rule?, 31 S.C. L. REV. 617 (1980).
23. For discussion of manifest and latent functions, see R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY
AND SociAL STRUCTURE 115-21 (rev. ed. 1968).
24. See A. MILLER, ORACLE IN THE MARBLE PALACE: POLMCS AND THE SUPREME COURT
(forthcoming). See also Parenti, The Constitution as an Elitist Document, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CoNsTrrUTIoN 39 (R. Goldwin & W. Schalbra eds. 1980).
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ary in any modern industrial society, however composed, under
whatever economic system, is an essential part of the system of
government and .

.

. its function may be described as underpin-

ning the stability of that system and as protecting that system
from attack by resisting attempts to change."2
As important and interesting as these ideas are, this review is
not the place to develop them fully. I have done so in an as yet
unpublished book on the Supreme Court.2 The remainder of this
review must necessarily be limited to the suggestion of a few ideas
that Jenkins should have taken into consideration, not so much to
change his conclusions as to put his analysis into larger context.
Consider the following statements, each of which in my opinion is
a harsh fact of life (although others may disagree):
A political theorist:
[t]he free way of life depends, to an extent.., not yet dreamed of, on the
Western nations remedying the
inequality of human rights as between our7
selves and the poor nations.

An economist:
As we head into the 1980s, it is well to remember that there is really only one

important question in political economy. If elected, whose income do you and
your party plan to cut in the process of solving the economic problems facing
8

us?

A biologist stating his "Iron Laws of Ecology":
You can't win.
You can't break even.
Things are going to get worse before they get better.
They are not going to get better.

And you can't get out of the game."'
A professor of religion:
We are sadly forced to conclude that we live in a world that is functionally
godless and that human rights and dignity depend upon the power of one's
community to grant or withhold them from its members ....

It is an error to imagine that civilization and savage cruelty are
antitheses. On the contrary, in every organic process, the antitheses always
25. J. GRIFFITH, THE PoLrTIcs OF THE JuDIcIARY 213 (paperback ed. 1977). See Miner,
The Politics of the American Judiciary, 49 POL. Q. 200 (1978).
26. A. MILLER, supra note 24.
27.

C. MACPHERSON, THE REAL WORLD OF DEMocRAcY 67 (1966).
AND THE PossmILITms FOR

28. L. THuRow, THE ZERo-SuM SocmY: DISTRBUTION
ECONOMIC CHANGE 214 (1980).

29. Professor Paul Ehrlich, in personal conversation with the present author. See P.
EHRLICH, A. EHRLICH & J. HOLDREN, EcoscIENcE: POPULATION, RESOURCES, ENvmoNmNr (2d
ed. 1977).
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reflect a unified totality, and civilization is an organic process . ... Mankind moved from one type of civilization involving its distinctive modes of
both sanctity and inhumanity to another. In our times the cruelties, like most
other aspects of our world, have become far more effectively administered
°
than ever before. They have not and they will not cease to existY

Balance these views against Professor Jenkins' belief that the
task of law is "to assure a stable and fruitful order in which men
can plan securely, carry on effective transactions among themselves
and with the world, and reap the benefits that are latent in their
nature and position." ' Law to him is a principle "that determines
a rule of order, a uniformity and regularity, that would not
otherwise exist. '8 2 Jenkins speaks at one point about "the cruel
...

recognition that the realization of value often entails the sacrifice
of value," 8 which seems to be the precise point that Lester
Thurow (the economist quoted above) makes in The Zero-Sum
Society.34 Jenkins, however, does not develop the point. Although
Jenkins touches on human nature, he concludes that it is "so complex and plastic and the human situation is so volatile that they
defy reduction to any simple set of categories. 8 5 Conclusions
about human nature, however, are central to Jenkins' thesis.
Surely he should have probed more deeply into the psychology of
humankind. What, for example, would Jenkins have to say about
the conclusion of Professor Rubenstein (the professor of religion
quoted above) that civilization and savage cruelty are not antithetical? One judicial decision that Jenkins discusses at some
length, Wyatt v. Stickney3 6 dealing with conditions in Alabama's
mental hospitals, might well illustrate Rubenstein's views.
Professor Jenkins also speaks of "men" without defining the
term or limiting it geographically. Professor C.B. Macpherson (the
political theorist quoted above) makes the point that "men"-30. R. RUBENSTIN, THE CUNNING OF HISTORY. MAsS DATH AND THE AMEmcAN FUTURE
91, 92 (1975) (emphasis in original).
31.
. JENKINS, supra note 6, at 19.
32. Id. at 11.
33. Id. at 129.
34. L. THuRow, supra note 28.
35. L JENKINS, supra note 6, at 314.
36. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974), discussed in L JENKINs, supra note 6, at 135-50, 282-83. In Wyatt,
Judge Frank Johnson recognized a constitutional "right to treatment" of those involuntarily
committed to mental hospitals. See 325 F. Supp. at 784. This decision is a classic example of
how unrepresented minorities can sometimes (but not often) obtain judicial relief from indecent treatment by government officers. Professor Jenkins' discussion should be compared
with Judge Johnson's discourse on Wyatt. See, e.g., Johnson, In Defense of Judicial Activism, 28 EMORY L.J. 901 (1979).
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"humankind"-must, in any theory of law and social order, be defined to include people everywhere.3 7 In the main, Jenkins seems to
speak of the American situation only; his references are entirely to
the American experience. That focus, to be sure, is acceptable, but
only if what happens in the United States is not affected by what
occurs elsewhere and if other legal systems react in essentially the
same manner as ours. If one agrees with Macpherson that the values of American constitutionalism depend in large part upon what
happens in other parts of the world, then surely some reference
must be made to the world community.
Much the same can be said about Paul Ehrlich's "iron laws of
ecology." Ehrlich (the biologist quoted above) is telling us in succinct terms what Thurow said as an economist and what is inferential in Rubenstein's essay: humankind, in sum, is in the midst of
one of the great turning points in history-a sea of change in the
way that Homo sapiens face the environment. We are not in a
crisis but a climacteric, a coalescence of crises.3 8
I do not suggest that Professor Jenkins is not aware of these
matters. He is. Further, his is an essay rather than an in-depth
treatise. Nevertheless, Jenkins' exposition of abstract matters
would have been aided had he asked and answered the crucial
question, "cui bono?," in a larger context. Had he done so, he
might have helped answer the question of how government can be
obliged to control itself, and thus show some of the shortcomings
in Madison's assumptions and in the liberal theory of the rule of
law.
Despite this criticism, I should like to conclude by reiterating
that this book is an important contribution. The basic point that
Professor Jenkins fails to consider-in addition, perhaps, to those
listed above-is that law, however created, is the ultimate means
by which people can "work within the system" and try to prevail in
the endless pursuit of justice in an imperfect society. As faulty as
law is-Jenkins shows its faults-no means of social control other
than law is as promising. To realize the promise of law means,
however, that we will have to know a great deal more about law
and its function in the social order. I can think of no better place
to start than the volume being reviewed.
37. This theme is central to the recent massive tome, M. McDOUGAL, H. LAssWELL &
L. CHEN, HuMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (1980).
38. See A. MILLER, supra note 3. See also Miller, Reason of State and the Emergent
Constitution of Control, supra note 3, at 613-14.

